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MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE ST. JOHNS,
SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1862
PART I
The Union Navy Fails to Drive the Confederates
From St. Johns Bluff
by EDWIN C. B EARSS

A

passed the Union blockade of the Southern
coast increased in effectiveness. To make matters worse for
the Confederacy, Union amphibious commands were put ashore
at a number of points, vital ports and strategic forts were seized,
and the number of points at which blockade runners could land
their valuable cargos were constantly reduced. On the east coast
of Florida, Fernandina, Fort Clinch, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine had been occupied by the Federals in March, 1862. The
following month, Jacksonville was evacuated by the Unionists.
During the months following the completion of the Florida,
Atlantic & Gulf Central Railroad, Jacksonville gained increasing
importance as a port of call for blockade runners. But if Jacksonville was to be held, the approach to the city via the St. Johns
River would have to be fortified. By the beginning of September,
1862, Brigadier General Joseph Finegan, commander of the Department of East and Middle Florida, began this project. 1 Before leaving for Jacksonville, the general called a detachment of
the Leon Florida Artillery led by Lieutenant F. L. Villepigue to
Tallahassee. The gunners brought two 12-pounder rifles with
them. At Tallahassee, they were assigned two additional guns,
8-inch siege howitzers, which had been dismounted and removed
recently from the battery at St. Marks.
S THE MONTHS

1. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Armies, 69 vols. (Washington, 18801901), Series I, Vol. XIV, 477. (Cited hereafier as O. R.); D. Ammen, The Atlantic Coast: Vol. II: The Navy in the Civil War (New
York, 1883), 70. General Finegan had assumed command of the
Department of East and Middle Florida on April 18, 1862.
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Accompanied by Villepigue’s artillerists, Finegan left Tallahassee by rail on the morning of September 6. Stopping briefly
at Lake City, the Confederates picked up two 32-pounder rifles,
before proceeding on to Jacksonville. There, the general found
Battery A, Milton Light Artillery Battalion, Captain Joseph L.
Dunham commanding, and Finegan turned the two siege howitzers and the rifled 32-pounders over to him. Captain Dunham
was placed in command of all the artillerists. 2
Finegan, who was familiar with the area, planned to fortify
St. Johns Bluff, a commanding point on the south side of the
river, about five miles from its mouth. Guns, ammunition, supplies, and personnel were ferried across the river at Jacksonville
in flatboats on September 7. After disembarking on the right
bank, the troops loaded their heavy equipment into wagons
and marched to the bluff. There Finegan found five companies
of cavalry-and Captain John C. Richard’s infantry company of
the 1st Florida Special Battalion. 3 A large number of Negroes
had been collected to help with work on the fortifications.
Speed was essential to the success of the operation, and Finegan worked his men and the Negroes round-the-clock. By nightfall on the 9th, emplacements had been thrown up, magazines
dug, ammunition stockpiled, and six guns mounted. As yet, the
Federals had given no indication that they suspected anything
was amiss at St. Johns Bluff. The next morning, General Finegan returned to Jacksonville to make arrangements for transferring two 8-inch columbiads and two more 8-inch siege howitzers
to the bluff. These four big guns had been brought to Jacksonville from the upper St. Johns, and Finegan wanted to get these
additional pieces of heavy ordnance in position before the Federals learned what the Confederates were about. 4
* * *
During the first days of September, 1862, the Union force
blockading the mouth of the St. Johns consisted of the armed

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol42/iss3/5

2

Bearss: Military Operations on the St. Johns, September-October 1862 (Par
234

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL Q UARTERLY

steamers Patroon and Uncas. 5 Acting Master Lemuel C. Crane
of the Uncas as senior officer was in charge of the small flotilla.
On September 1, the two gunboats made a run up the St.
Johns as far as St. Johns and Yellow Bluffs. Confederate cavalry
was sighted by the lookouts. Opening fire, the warships scattered
the Southerners, and then the vessels returned to their station off
the bar.
To try to keep abreast of what was happening ashore, frequent landings were made by the Federals and much valuable
information was gleaned by questioning the people of Mayport.
Rumor had it that General Finegan was working on plans which
would lead to the capture of the gunboats. If successful, Confederate leaders reportedly intended to hang the Union sailors as
kidnapers. Confederate troops were said to be moving into the
Jacksonville area. Captain Dunham’s battery of the Milton Light
Artillery, and companies from the 2d Florida Cavalry and 2d
Florida Battalion of Partisan Rifles had been identified. Orders
were issued by Finegan to fire on the Federals if they tried to land
near Jacksonville.
When he relayed this information to Rear Admiral Samuel
F. Du Pont on September 9, Crane warned, “I am perfectly satisfied that the rebels in this vicinity are getting stronger and bolder
every day, and I sincerely trust you will give this matter your
kind attention, . . .” 6
On the morning of September 9, the chief engineer aboard
the Uncas reported his coal bunkers were nearly empty. Acting
Master Crane decided to take his ship up the coast to Fernandina
and coal it, and after informing Acting Master William D. Urann
of the Patroon of his plans he started northward. Taking aboard
5.

Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War
of the Rebellion, 30 vols. (Washington, 1894-1922), Series I, Vol.
XIII, 301. (Cited hereafter as O. R. N.) A wooden steamer which
had been purchased by the U. S. Navy on October 28, 1861, the
Patroon displaced 183 tons. At this stage of the conflict, she was
armed with one 20-pounder Parrott and four 32-pounders. The
Uncas, a screw steamer of 190 tons, had been purchased by the
navy on September 20, 1861. She was armed with one 20-pounder
Parrott and two 32-pounders. O. R. N., Series II, Vol. 1, 171, 228.
6. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 301-302. Dunham’s artillerists were
said to be camped along the Florida Railroad, about eight miles from
Jacksonville. Admiral Du Pont commanded the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.
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all the coal she could carry, the Uncas returned to her station
late on the afternoon of the 10th.
Urann of the Patroon informed Crane that while he was away
the previous night a “contraband” had come aboard. The Negro
informed the Federals that 500 Confederates with several pieces
of artillery, had crossed the St. Johns at Jacksonville on Sunday,
the 7th. There was reason to believe that the Southerners planned
to emplace these guns at St. Johns Bluff.
Crane, “having been often deceived by contrabands,” was inclined to discount the story. But after discussing the situation
with his officers, he decided to investigate.
At dark, the hands were piped to their quarters, and the
Uncas got under way. Steaming slowly, she crossed the bar, entered the river, moving up to a point three-quarters mile from the
bluff. Except for a few camp fires, the Federals were not able
to spot any signs of activity ashore. The Uncas anchored, and a
small boat was lowered and manned. A kedge was put out aft.
Within a few minutes, the gunboat was moored with her port
broadside facing the bluff.
Meanwhile, the gunners had shotted the three big guns.
Crane passed the word, and a gun captain pulled his lanyard.
There was a flash, followed by a boom. A projectile from a 32pounder crashed into the darkened heights. Before the order to
cease firing was given, eight other missiles were hurled into various sections of the bluff. Not wishing to disclose prematurely the
location of their gun pits, the Confederates had held their fire.
Long before daybreak on the 11th, the Confederate gunners
had eaten their breakfasts and had taken position in the emplacements. Ammunition and powder were brought up from the magazines. As soon as it was light enough to see, six guns were loaded
and trained on the unsuspecting gunboat. Captain Dunham, who
was in charge during Finegan’s absence, shouted “Fire!” There
were a series of dull booms. Clouds of smoke billowed as the
Southerners’ heavy ordnance roared.
The crew of the Uncas had been caught napping. The 32pounders had been run in so that the sailors could swab the deck,
and valuable moments were lost as the men now scrambled to
battle stations. The two 32-pounders were cast loose and shotted.
Simultaneously, the cable was slipped and the kedge cast adrift.
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Acting Master Crane calculated the Confederate shore batteries
had fired at least ten times before his own guns were in position
to reply. A grim duel ensued between the Uncas and the Confederate shore batteries. Crane maneuvered his craft constantly
to hinder the Southerners’ fire control. At times, he ran the craft
to within 500 yards of the bluff, then he would make a rapid
sweep downstream.
Shortly after the engagement commenced, on one of the
Uncas’ runs down river, Crane had his signalman call for aid
from the Patroon. Because of a strong ebb tide, however, the
Patroon encountered considerable difficulty crossing the bar, and
the battle had been in progress for an hour and a half before she
came within range and joined in the bombardment. By this time,
the Uncas had been hit five times. One of these projectiles, which
fortunately for the Federals did not explode, struck her just above
the waterline on the port bow and entered the magazine. In return, the Federals had temporarily silenced one of the Confederate’s rifled 32-pounders. 7
After the arrival of the Patroon, the gunboats shelled the
bluff for another two hours and twenty minutes. The Federals
were gaining the upper hand, and fire control on the Confederates’ part became erratic. T hey were not able to hit the gunboats
as they steamed back and forth. At one point, the sailors compelled
the Southerners to cease firing, and through the smoke, the gun
pointers discerned Confederates abandoning the pits. Captain
Dunham, within a short time, had his pieces back in action, however. Despairing of being able to dislodge the batteries on St.
Johns Bluff, the two gunboats ceased firing and returned to their
blockade stations. 8
Totalling his losses, Captain Dunham listed one man killed
and eight wounded. Captain J. H. McRory, acting chief engineer, had been stabbed by a bayonet while sliding down an em7. Ibid., 324-325. A second shell had ripped through the wind sail
over the wardroom, a third through the pilothouse near where Acting Master Crane was standing, while the two others carried away
“running gear, chain, span for boat, crane, etc.” O. R. N., Series I,
Vol. XIII, 325.
8. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 325; O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 121.
During the engagement, the U n c a s fired 143 shells and 13 solid
shot, while the Patroon expended about 60 shells.

Published by STARS, 1963

5

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 42 [1963], No. 3, Art. 5

M ILITARY O PERATIONS

ON THE

S T . J OHNS

237

bankment. Dunham, inspecting guns and emplacements, reported only slight damage. 9
General Finegan was relieved to learn that Captain Dunham
and his artillerists had held their own in the duel with the gunboats. On the 12th he sent down to the bluff the four big guns
which he had secured from Jacksonville. The two columbiads
were especially welcomed by the cannoneers, because they were
hard-hitting weapons, whose 65-pound projectiles could be expected to cause heavy damage to the wooden Federal gunboats
on their next visit. 10
From Jacksonville, Finegan returned to Tallahassee. Writing
to the War Department on the 15th, he reported what had happened at St. Johns Bluff. If he could hold the bluff, he wrote,
it would “relieve the valley of the Saint Johns from the marauding incursions of the enemy and afford a base for operations
against Saint Augustine.” One regiment added to his command
would probably enable him to recapture and hold St. Augustine. 11
Secretary of War George W. Randolph liked Finegan’s dispatch and ordered General Pierre G. T. Beauregard to rush a
regiment from Savannah to East Florida, if it could be spared. 12
It took Acting Master Crane’s report of the September 11
engagement four days to reach Admiral Du Pont, whose flagship
-the Wabash - was then at Port Royal, South Carolina. The
admiral read with interest Crane’s communication, 13 and decided
to take action to eliminate this pocket of resistance before the
Southerners could expand the scope of their operation. If left
undisturbed, the Confederates might drive the Union gunboats
from the St. Johns.
Orders were issued on September 15 for the Paul Jones, Commander Charles Steedman commanding, to proceed immediately
to the St. Johns. Steedman would be accompanied by the Cim9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

0 . R . , Series I, Vol. XIV, 121.
Ibid., 120.
Ibid., 122.
Ibid.
O. R. N, Series I, Vol. XIII, 325-326. When he acknowledged
Crane’s dispatch, the admiral noted, “Your conduct as well as that of
the officers and crew of your vessel and the Patroon merits my approbation, and I desire to express the same to you.” Ibid., 326.
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marron, Commander Maxwell Woodhull; and the E. B. Hale,
Lieutenant Alfred T. Snell, if they were ready to sail. If not they
were to follow as soon as possible. 14
Steedman would make a thorough reconnaissance of the St.
Johns, to whatever point he deemed it “advisable and of service.”
Landing parties would be landed to destroy Confederate earthworks. At Jacksonville, a party covered by a flag of truce would
investigate what was “meant by this attack upon our boats.” The
townspeople would be warned that if they continued such activities Jacksonville would be destroyed.
Du Pont called Steedman’s attention to the law recently enacted by Congress, stipulating that “contrabands” seeking protection aboard Union warships were to be returned to their owners.
Steedman would enter in his log the name of the fugitive slave
and his “owner or claimant.”
The admiral cautioned Steedman: “As you are aware, I have
every confidence in your zeal and judgment; your force is very
strong in one sense, but not of that kind to prevent great annoyance by musketry from the banks of the river, and I rely upon
your discretion to save your crews as much as possible from this,
consistent with the execution of your orders.” 15
By nightfall on September 16, the Paul Jones, the Cimarron,
and the E. B. Hale had arrived off Mayport. Acting Masters
Crane and Urann lost no time in reporting to Commander Steedman. During the evening, Steedman held a staff meeting aboard
the Paul Jones, calling upon Crane and Urann for all the information they possessed concerning Confederate fortifications along
14. Ibid., 327. A large side-wheel gunboat, the Paul Jones, had been
built for the Navy Department by J. J. Abrahams of Baltimore. She
had been commissioned on July 9, 1862. The Paul Jones was armed
with one 100-pounder Parrott, two 9-inch Dahlgrens, one 11-inch
Dahlgren, two 50-pounder Dahlgren rifles, and two 24-pounder
howitzers. A large steamer similar to the Paul Jones, the Cimarron
had been built by D. S. Mershan of Bordentown, New Jersey. She
was launched on March 16, 1862, and displaced 860 tons. The
Cimarron was armed with one 100-pounder Parrott, one 9-inch
Dahlgren, and six 24-pounder howitzers. A much smaller gunboat,
the E. B. Hale, had been purchased by the Navy Department from
E. & D. Bigelow on July 27, 1861, for $23,000. The E. B. Hale
was armed with four 32-pounders. O. R. N., Series II, Vol. I, 58,
77, 171.
15. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 327-328.
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the St. Johns. Then Steedman instructed the assembled officers
to return to their ships and be ready to cast off at daybreak.
The officers turned their men out long before the designated
hour. Fires were stoked and the sailors ate a hearty breakfast.
At 6 a.m. the signal to weigh anchor was hoisted by the Paul
Jones, which then took the lead as the five gunboats crossed the
bar. Steaming along in single file, the vessels moved up the St.
Johns. Shortly after entering the river, “General Quarters” sounded, sending the crews scrambling to their battle stations. Projectiles were placed in the ready boxes; the big guns were cast loose
and shotted.
As his vessel headed upstream, Commander Steedman swept
the banks with his powerful glass. Steedman shouted for the
crew manning the big pivot gun, a 100-pounder Parrott, to fire
when his warship had closed to within 2,000 yards of St. Johns
Bluff. There was a wild cheer as the big shell struck the bluff
and exploded with a roar. Moments later, Commander Woodhull,
taking his cue from the Paul Jones, turned the Cimarron’s pivot
gun on the bluff. The three smaller gunboats, not armed with
heavy ordnance, held their fire.
Focusing their glasses on the bluff, the officers could see fresh
scars in the earth where the Confederates had thrown up parapets
to protect their guns and enemy artillerists were spotted. At first,
the Southerners seemed to ignore the approaching warships. Only
when there was a flash, warning that one of the big Parrotts had
spoken, did they take cover in their bombproofs.
The Paul Jones, closely followed by the Cimarron, closed to
within 1,600 yards of the bluff. Misunderstanding Steedman’s
plan, the three smaller gunboats continued to run up the river,
one behind the other. They accordingly found their field of fire
obstructed by the Paul Jones and the Cimarron. 16
Captain Dunham now ordered his artillerists into action. Unfortunately for the Confederates, they had not had time to emplace the four guns General Finegan had sent down from Jacksonville on the 12th. The Southerners commenced “a quick and
well-directed fire” on the two leading Union warships. Geysers
16. Ibid., 329-330. Commander Steedman had intended for the three
small gunboats (the E. B. Hale, the Uncas, and the Patroon, to move
to the attack abreast instead of in column at the first shot.
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of water were thrown up, and the decks of the gunboats were
drenched by near misses. A missile from one of the Confederate
32-pounders tore a hole through the Paul Jones’ smokestack.
Aboard the vessels, the gun spotters reported most of the Confederates’ guns mounted in a strong earthwork. Several smaller
pieces fired from masked positions in the woods. Evidently, the
crew of one of the 32-pounders had registered their piece on a
spot in the river just above the mouth of Sisters Creek. Each
time the Paul Jones or the Cimarron tried to pass this point, they
were exposed to the well-aimed fire of this piece. Several big
68-pound bolts crashed into the two gunboats without doing too
much damage.
Keeping constantly under way, the Paul Jones and the Cimarron hammered the works on the bluff and the woods with their
heavy guns. After about two hours, the Confederate cannoneers
ceased shooting. Even so, Commander Steedman decided not to
take his ships beyond the 1,600 yard mark. Steedman needed a
landing party of marines or soldiers to go ashore. He believed the
Confederate works could be easily taken. The warships shelled
the fortifications for another hour without eliciting any reply.
It was not until the gunnery officers aboard the Paul Jones
and the Cimarron notified Steedman that they had expended over
one-half their ammunition that the “cease action” signal was
hoisted. The five gunboats turned around, and, led by the flagship, returned to their anchorage off Mayport.
Steedman immediately drafted a report for Admiral Du Pont.
After describing what had occurred, the commander gave his
reasons for not going to Jacksonville after the Southern guns had
been silenced. If he had, Steedman wrote, it would have left a
Confederate stronghold in his rear. As soon as the Union gunboats had moved up river, the Southerners would have repaired
their works and would have been ready to blast the task force
on its return. Moreover, Steedman did not feel that a demonstration against Jacksonville would have much effect until the
guns at St. Johns Bluff had been spiked by a Federal landing
party.
From what he had seen, Steedman was satisfied the Confedates had been working day and night and the bluff had been converted into a formidable stronghold with heavy field works and
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reasons for not going to Jacksonville after the Southern guns had
been silenced. If he had, Steedman wrote, it would have left a
Confederate stronghold in his rear. As soon as the Union gunboats had moved up river, the Southerners would have repaired
their works and would have been ready to blast the task force
on its return. Moreover, Steedman did not feel that a demonstration against Jacksonville would have much effect until the
guns at St. Johns Bluff had been spiked by a Federal landing
party.
From what he had seen, Steedman was satisfied the Confedates had been working day and night and the bluff had been converted into a formidable stronghold with heavy field works and
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rifle pits. He was “strongly of the opinion” that the Confederates
could not be dislodged except by “a combined land and naval
attack.” While his squadron could always drive the cannoneers
from their guns, they would return as soon as the ships withdrew. 17
Acting Master Crane carried Steedman’s letter to Port Royal.
After delivering the dispatch Crane picked up a supply of ammunition and rejoined the task force. 18
After the withdrawal of the bombardment squadron, Captain
Dunham had his officers muster their commands. When rolls
were called the Southerners found that two men had been killed
and three wounded. Working parties were detailed, and large
numbers of men, both white and Negro, were turned to repairing and strengthening the earthworks.
General Finegan, learning of the attack, left Tallahassee for
the St. Johns. From Lake City on the 19th, he wired Richmond,
arguing that since the Union gunboats had failed to pass the batteries at St. Johns Bluff, they would now undertake an amphibious attack. Finegan hoped to counter such a move, but he
needed reinforcements. “Can you send one regiment of infantry
from coast of Georgia or Carolina?” he inquired. 19
*
*
*
Admiral Du Pont studied Steedman’s dispatch which he received on the afternoon of September 19. He agreed that troops
were needed to attack the Confederate batteries on the St. Johns
from the rear, while gunboats hammered them from the river.
Du Pont immediately sent a request for assistance to Major
General Ormsby M. Mitchell, newly appointed commander of
the Department of the South. 1,500 soldiers under Brigadier
General John M. Brannan were to be ready to board transports
early on September 22 for the St. Johns.
In the meantime the Uncas was being loaded with most of
the types of ammunition requested by Steedman. When the offi17. Ibid., 330.
18. Ibid. Steedman informed the admiral that in the attack he was
“ably supported by Commander Woodhull in the Cimarron.” The
captains of the three small gunboats, he reported, “seemed well disposed to do their duty.” Of the officers and men of the Paul Jones,
Steedman could not “speak too highly.”
19. O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 122.
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cer in charge of the magazine checked, he was disappointed to
discover that he had no shells for 100-pounder Parrotts. The
only surplus projectiles for these powerful rifles were aboard the
Sebago, which was operating in Wassaw Sound. At first, Du Pont
considered sending the Uncas back to the St. Johns by way of
Wassaw Sound but changed his mind.

When the Uncas left Port Royal, Crane carried a letter from
the admiral to Steedman. Besides telling the commander of the
steps being taken to assist him, Du Pont ordered him to harass
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the Confederates. An occasional shot hurled into the bluff would
keep them from strengthening their fortifications, pending arrival
of Brannan and his troops, Du Pont thought. 20
The equinox was at hand, and the weather along the South
Atlantic coast took a sudden turn for the worse. There were
heavy rains and high winds on the 21st. Du Pont advised General Mitchell not to embark the troops until the storm passed.
From long experience at sea, he knew that the bars off the mouths
of the rivers along this section of coast were generally impassable
for a day or so after a storm. 21
There was a break in the weather on the 23d, and taking
advantage of this situation, the Uncas sailed for the St. Johns.
Meanwhile, Du Pont ordered another gunboat to reinforce Steedman’s task force. Lieutenant Commander Austin Pendergrast was
to proceed to Wassaw Sound with his vessel, the Water Witch. 22
There, he would call on the captain of the Sebago to furnish him
thirty 100-pounder Parrott projectiles. At St. Simon’s 50 more
shells would be secured from the Pawnee. Upon reaching the St.
Johns, Pendergrast would turn this ammunition over to Commander Steedman. 23
Du Pont now notified Mitchell that it was safe for the troop
transports to move out into the Atlantic. Undoubtedly, the bar
at the mouth of the St. Johns would still be “disturbed,” but he
hoped it would be passable as the spring tides were running.
The admiral cautioned Mitchell that September was a hurricane month along this section of the coast. If another storm developed and it was too dangerous to cross the St. Johns bar, the
transports could run into Fernandina. In this case, utmost secrecy
as to the destination of the expedition would have to be observed,
because there was a constant flow of news between Fernandina
and Jacksonville. 24
20.
21.
22.

O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 336-337.
Ibid., 339.
Ibid., 341. A side-wheel gunboat, the Water Witch, had been launched at the Washington Navy Yard in 1852. Displacing 378 tons, the
wooden gunboat was armed with one 30-pounder Parrott, one 12pounder rifle, and two 12-pounder smoothbores. O. R. N., Series II,
Vol. I, 237.
23. O . R . N . , S e r i e s I , V o l . X I I I , 3 4 1 . A f t e r r e p o r t i n g t o S t e e d m a n ,
Pendergrast would remain with him until the projected operation
had been completed or the task force commander had an important
communication which he wished carried to Port Royal.
24. Ibid., 342-343.
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On September 24 General Mitchell notified Du Pont that
Brannan was being directed to have his troops and equipment
aboard ship and be ready to sail at 10 a.m. on the 25th. 25
General Brannan’s soldiers spent a busy night and morning,
but by the designated hour the men and their gear were loaded.
Before the ships reached Hilton Head, the weather thickened and
the wind began to howl. Not wishing to risk a storm at sea,
Brannan determined to turn back. As soon as the transports tied
up at Beaufort wharf, the soldiers disembarked and returned to
their camps. The march from the landing was disagreeable, because by this time a driving rain had set in. 26
Five days passed before it cleared off and the heavy seas
subsided. On the morning of the 30th, Brannan ordered his
troops, 1,573 strong, back aboard the transports. The four transports (the Ben De Ford, the Boston, the Cosmopolitan, and the
Neptune) sailed that afternoon, and this time there was no turning back. 27
The Federal transports arrived off the bar of the St. Johns
at 6 a.m. on October 1. Signals were exchanged with the warships of Commander Steedman’s task force which were in the
river, anchored off Mayport. The tide was out, and Steedman
signaled Brannan not to enter the river. At the same time, he
sent Acting Master Philemon Dickinson in a small boat to inform
the general that he should encounter no difficulty in crossing the
bar at high tide. Dickinson spent the morning briefing the pilots
aboard the transports.
At 1 p.m. the transports got under way. Guided by the bouys
and Dickinson’s verbal instructions, the steamers entered the
St. Johns and anchored off Mayport Mills. 28 General Brannan
immediately called on Commander Steedman, asking him to in25.
26.
27.

28.

Ibid., 346.
O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 136.
Ibid., 129, 136; Stephen Walkley, History of the Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, Hawley’s Brigade, Terry’s Division, Tenth
A r m y C o r p s , 1 8 6 1 - 1 8 6 5 ( M e r i d i a n , 1 9 0 5 ) , 5 7 . B r a n n a n ’s e x p e ditionary force included: the 47th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Colonel
Tilghman H. Good commanding; the 7th Connecticut, Colonel Joseph R. Hawley; Lieutenant James S. Cannon’s section, 1st Battery,
Connecticut Light Artillery; detachment 1st Massachusetts Cavalry.
The soldiers of the 7th Connecticut were embarked on the Ben de
Ford.
O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 355, 362.
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vestigate the river and ascertain whether the Confederates had
strengthened their position at St. Johns Bluff. Steedman gave this
assignment to Commander Woodhull of the Cimarron and he was
accompanied by the gunboats Water Witch and Uncas. 29
*
*
*
There had been a change in command at St. Johns Bluff on
September 26. Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Hopkins took
charge of the post. He immediately made a thorough inspection
of the magazines and batteries, and ordered the works strengthened. The four guns rushed to the area on the 12th by General
Finegan were to be mounted.
When Hopkins first arrived there were five gunboats anchored
off Mayport. On the 29th, Confederate scouts spotted the Water
Witch as she crossed the bar. At first, Hopkins was perplexed by
the Federals’ actions, and wondered why no attempts were made
to harass his working parties. The mystery was dispelled, however, when his scouts reported “heavy work was being done on
board the boats.” Hopkins now suspected that when the next
attack came, it would be a joint army-navy enterprise.
A message was relayed to General Finegan on the 30th,
calling for at least one regiment of infantry to help defend the
bluff against a Union landing. The small force of infantry on
hand, Hopkins felt, was too small to repel an attack. To make
matters worse, there was only enough small-arms ammunition to
last for approximately an hour of “close combat.”
One of Captain John Westcott’s men, Sergeant J. F. Floyd,
climbed the old lighthouse. From his vantage point, the sergeant
was able to see a large number of men, whom he mistakenly
took to be soldiers, crowded on the decks of a large steamer.
Westcott lost no time in forwarding this intelligence to Colonel
Hopkins. A rider left Hopkins’ command post shortly thereafter
with another dispatch for Finegan, informing him of what Floyd
had seen. Hopkins repeated his request for reinforcements.
Hopkins’ pickets were watching when the four transports with
Brannan’s troops crossed the bar. An express rider was sent to
Yellow Bluff with a message for Captain Dunham, ordering him
29. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 355.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol42/iss3/5

14

Bearss: Military Operations on the St. Johns, September-October 1862 (Par
246

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL Q UARTERLY

to dismount the three cavalry companies under his command and
rush them by steamer to St. Johns Bluff. 30
As the Cimarron drew abreast of Sisters Creek, the Confederate batteries on St. Johns Bluff “opened a heavy and well-directed
fire.” Large caliber projectiles struck the water around the Union
vessel. It was apparent to the Federals that the Southern artillerists were not recruits. They knew how to cut their fuses, because
the shells exploded as they struck the water. The decks of the
Cimarron were soaked by spray thrown up by a number of near
misses. Aboard the vessel the gun crews turned their pieces on
the bluff. As soon as they came within range, the Water Witch
and the Uncas also joined in the bombardment.
Besides having to breast a strong ebb tide, the gunboats were
buffeted by high winds. Because of these adverse conditions,
the helmsmen had a difficult time keeping their vessels under
control. Commander Woodhull found it all but impossible to
maneuver the Cimarron so as to bring her battery to bear with
maximum effect.
Suddenly there was a grinding noise. The Cimarron had
grounded about 200 yards above the mouth of Sisters Creek.
Here, she was exposed to a raking fire for about fifteen minutes.
The Water Witch also touched bottom as she sought to come to
the big gunboat’s assistance. Big Confederate shells exploded all
around the Cimarron, and the sailors aboard the Water Witch
and the Uncas though she was being struck repeatedly, but she
remained unscathed. A sudden shift in the wind enabled the
crew to refloat their ship. Dropping downstream about 100 yards,
Commander Woodhull prepared to make another run up the St.
Johns. 31
General Brannan and Commander Steedman had listened
with keen interest as Woodhull’s gunboats had duelled with the
Confederate guns. Satisfied that the reconnaissance had accomplished its purpose, Steedman ordered a signal gun fired and the
recall hoisted. 32
30. O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 138-139; Jacksonville Southern Rights,
Oct. 4, 1862.
31. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 356.
32. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 355.
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The lookouts aboard the Cimarron saw the flash and smoke
as the signal gun spoke. When Woodhull turned his glass on
the flagship, he saw the signal flags flapping. Hailing the captains of the Water Witch and the Uncas, Woodhull told them to
suspend action. The three gunboats steamed down river and anchored off Pablo Creek, just beyond the range of the big enemy
guns.
Communicating with Steedman, Woodhull informed him that
the Confederates had increased the strength of their battery since
the engagement on September 17. From what had been observed during the ninety minutes his vessel was engaged, Woodhull believed the Southerners now had four or five big smoothbores and one or two heavy rifles. A second battery had been
thrown up below the main emplacement. 33
Meanwhile, the troops had started landing at Mayport Mills.
The horses were pushed overboard, and most of them were able
to swim toward a sand bank about a quarter mile from the Cosmopolitan. In several instances, however, they made for the passage
through the bar and had to be chased by small boats. One horse
was drowned, and General Brannan’s horse had its leg broken
and had to be destroyed. It was after dark before the last of the
horses reached ashore. 34
The soldiers found several large sawmills, equipped with gang
saws, which gave evidence of having cut large quantities of lumber. There were also a number of small cottages, each containing
three or four rooms, that had been occupied by the mill hands,
but apparently they had been standing empty for at least six
months. The wind had drifted the “sand about them until some
drifts were twenty-five feet high and so compactly made that it
was possible for the . . . [Federals] to walk up the sand drifts
and on the roofs of the houses and look down the chimnies
[sic].” 35
33. Ibid., 356. Commander Woodhull commended “the conduct of the
officers and crew” of the Cimarron. Their conduct when under fire
called forth the commander’s surprise and admiration. Commander
Steedman noted in his After Action Report, “It affords me pleasure
to say that the whole affair was very gallantly and spiritedly done,
and reflects credit on Commander Woodhull, Lieutenant-Cmmander
Pendergrast, Acting Master Crane, and the officers and men engaged.”
Ibid., 3 6 2 .
34. O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 129; Herbert W. Beecher, History of the
1st Light Battery Connecticut Volunteers, 1861-1865 (New York,
1901), I, 198.
35. Beecher, History of the 1st Connecticut Battery, 199.
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